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(District Court No. 2:14-cv-06662) 
District Judge: Hon. Legrome D. Davis  
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Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 






                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Jean Sterner appeals the District Court’s grant of Appellee Siemens Medical 
Solutions USA, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment on her age discrimination claim.  
We will affirm.1 
I 
 
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act contain parallel provisions that prohibit age-based intentional discrimination in the 
employment context2—claims under the PHRA are accordingly interpreted coextensively 
with the ADEA.3  To prevail under the ADEA, a plaintiff must “establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the adverse 
employment action.”4  The plaintiff must present evidence that her age “played a role in 
[the employer’s decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on the 
outcome.”5  
 If a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the familiar three-part burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green6 applies.7  Under that 
                                              
1 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo the District Court's 
order granting Siemens summary judgment.  See Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of 
Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015). 
2 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), with 43 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 955(a) (West 
2017).   
3 See Willis, 808 F.3d at 643 (concluding that “the interpretation of the PHRA” is 
“identical” to that of the ADEA). 
4 Id. at 644 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009)). 
5 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (citation omitted).  
6 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
7 See Willis, 808 F.3d at 644. 
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framework, if a plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden 
of production shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for its 
employment decision.8  The employer can satisfy its burden “by introducing evidence 
which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory 
reason for the unfavorable employment decision.”9  If the employer satisfies this second 
step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason was pretextual, and discrimination was the real reason for the 
adverse employment decision.10  We have instructed as to that third step: 
 [T]he plaintiff generally must submit evidence which: 1) casts sufficient 
 doubt  upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so 
 that a  factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a 
 fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more 
 likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse 
 employment action.11  
 
 Under Fuentes’s first prong, to avoid summary judgment, “the non-moving 
plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its 
actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ʻunworthy of credence.’”12  
To avoid summary judgment under the second route for proving pretext, the plaintiff 
must present “evidence with ‘sufficient probative force’ so as to allow the factfinder to 
                                              
8 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 762. 
12 Id. at 765 (citation omitted). 
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‘conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a motivating or determinative 
factor.’”13  
 Here, the District Court found that Siemens had articulated legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for firing Sterner.   These included, inter alia, poor performance 
and deficient skills.  The District Court therefore determined that Siemens’s summary 
judgment motion “turn[ed] on whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 
[Sterner]’s articulated reasons for firing [her] were in fact pretext for unlawful 
discrimination and that [she] would not have been discharged but for her age.”14    
 The ultimate question before the District Court was whether the record contained 
sufficient evidence to allow “a reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for [Sterner].”15  The 
Court answered that question in the negative.   It concluded that Sterner had failed to 
raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Siemens’s reasons for terminating her were 
pretext for discrimination.   
II  
 
 Most of Sterner’s arguments on appeal boil down to a reiteration of factual 
disputes she marshals in support of her conclusions that her supervisor 1) misjudged her 
performance, 2) should have granted her more freedom to acquire new skills required for 
her position, and 3) gave instructions to her that were misguided, or that she had good 
reason to ignore.  Sterner also contends that her supervisor treated younger employees 
                                              
13 Willis, 808 F.3d at 645 (citations omitted). 
14 App. 19a.  
15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
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more favorably and that the District Court ignored the fact that Siemens had a 32 year-old 
employment record of positive evaluations and awards. 
 However, even “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [Sterner] and 
draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in [her] favor,”16 the relevant issue is whether her 
supervisor genuinely harbored the nondiscriminatory concerns cited as grounds for her 
termination, or whether those stated grounds were a pretext for unlawful age-based 
animus.17  Here, Siemens provided evidence that Sterner was disciplined and ultimately 
discharged due to her poor performance and failure to acquire skills needed for her 
position.  Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the reason for her 
termination was pretext.  Siemens cannot survive summary judgment because there is 
insufficient evidence “from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve 
[Siemens’s] articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of [Siemens’s] 
action.”18  
 We agree with the District Court that nothing in the supervisor’s words or deeds—
even if he mistreated her, prevented her from training, or otherwise falsely accused 
                                              
16 S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013). 
17 See Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering the pretext 
inquiry and finding that plaintiff’s “view of [her] performance is not at issue; what 
matters is the perception of the decision maker”), overruled in part on other grounds, St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).  
18 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. 
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her19—suggested that her age had any bearing on any of his decisions.  Sterner fails to 
provide anything other than her own speculation to support her contention that younger 
employees were treated more favorably or that the company attorney’s stray remark or 
subsequent hiring of a younger employee was probative of discrimination.20  
 Sterner maintains that the question of an employer’s discriminatory motive is ill-
suited for summary disposition, and the pretext inquiry, she claims, in fact, examines the 
employer’s motive.  She cites St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.21  There, the United 
States Supreme Court held that “there is always a question of material fact for the fact 
finder, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie [sic] case and raises genuine issues as 
to whether the employer’s proffered reasons for are [sic] pretextual.”22  However, the 
issue before the Court was whether a trier of fact’s rejection of an employer's asserted 
reasons for its actions requires a finding for the plaintiff.23     
Nothing in the District Court’s able opinion granting Siemens summary judgment 
contravenes Hicks.  Moreover, we “do not infer from the nature of discrimination suits 
                                              
19 We, like the District Court, could adduce little supporting evidence from the record for 
most of these allegations.   
20 Sterner averred that a company attorney had said in a September 2012 meeting that 
based on her allegations of discrimination, “this is grounds for a lawsuit” Appellant’s Br. 
5, 24 (citing App. 3).  The District Court determined not only that Sterner had provided 
weak evidence that the statement had actually been made, but also that, in any event, 
“[t]he statement itself was not a reference to age and did not relate to the decision to 
terminate Plaintiff’s employment.”  App. 27.  Moreover, “one stray suggestion [of a 
potential lawsuit basis] . . . [could not] give rise to an inference of discriminatory animus 
with respect to the decision to terminate [Sterner’s] position.”  Id.  We agree.  
21 509 U.S. 502 (1993).  
22 Appellee’s Br. 33. 
23 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504.   
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that a jury determination is required in every case.”24   Indeed, after Hicks, we reiterated 
that, to avoid summary judgment in a “pretext” case, a plaintiff must meet a substantial 
evidentiary burden.25 
 Sterner also argues that the District Court erred in finding that her Declaration was 
a “sham” based on inconsistencies with Sterner’s deposition testimony.  In Jiminez v. All 
American Rathskeller, Inc.,26 we stated that trial judges could disregard contradictory—or 
“sham”—affidavits, which are those that “indicate[] . . . that the affiant cannot maintain a 
consistent story or is willing to offer a statement solely for the purpose of defeating 
summary judgment.27  We further explained that a sham affidavit “cannot raise a genuine 
issue of fact because it is merely a variance from earlier deposition testimony, and 
therefore no reasonable jury could rely on it to find for the nonmovant.”28   
 Here, the District Court disregarded three Declaration passages that contradicted 
Sterner’s prior deposition testimony because she “ha[d] not provided a plausible 
explanation for her contradictory statements . . . .”29  On appeal, Sterner still fails to 
sufficiently explain the inconsistencies the District Court identified.  Instead, she spends 
the bulk of the discussion in her Brief to reciting passages from the Declaration.  We 
conclude that the District Court correctly applied the sham affidavit doctrine, and that it 
                                              
24 Billet, 940 F.2d at 828. 
25 See Willis, 808 F.3d at 645; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764–65. 
26 503 F.3d 247, 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2007). 
27 Id. at 253. 
28 Id.  
29 App. 2a–3a n.1.  
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did not inappropriately disregard those portions of Sterner’s Declaration that it found 
contradicted her deposition testimony.30   
III. 
 
 Because the District Court correctly concluded that the record evidence does not 
raise a triable issue of fact, we will affirm the judgment.   
                                              
30 Jiminez, 503 F.3d at 251, 254. 
 
